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WASHINGTON, DC, August 19, 2003 -
ICF Consulting released an issue paper titled Cascading
Blackout: Why Wasn't the Power Outage Contained?
This paper outlines the competitive pressures on existing
transmission grid operations. The sometimes conflicting
goals of providing reliability, moderating power prices,
deferring transmission investments, and avoiding the
economic liabilities associated with third-party power
transactions can cause transmission operators to take
greater risks with the grid than they have in the past.
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"If no contingencies occur, the transmission system
usually operates smoothly; we maintain reliability, wholesale
power prices are stable, and third-party generators gain access
to markets," says Philip Mihlmester, Senior Vice President
of ICF Consulting's Energy
practice. "However, if a contingency occurs under high-risk
circumstances, there is very little room for maneuverability,"
continues Mihlmester. "It's like driving a car at 30
mph and having a tire blow versus the same scenario while
driving 100 mph. There is very little reaction time in the
latter case."
So why was the blackout allowed to cascade throughout the
northeastern United States and portions of Canada, and not
contained locally?
When a transmission line fails, the power flow must be redirected
onto neighboring lines. Without sufficient reserve margin
on those lines, they become overloaded—causing a cascading
effect—shutting the system or a large portion of it down.
A possible reason the cascade was not stopped is because neighboring
transmission lines did not have sufficient reserve margin
available due to heavy volumes of power flow. North America's
power usage and the number of wholesale power transactions
over the transmission lines have simply outgrown the existing
transmission structure and the traditional reliability-based
operational protocols. The transmission grid also suffers
from declining investment over the past 25 years.
"Setting and enforcing consistent transmission reliability
standards, as well as incentivizing additional capital investment
in transmission, will help to prevent similar massive outages
in the future," emphasizes Mihlmester.
To learn more about the competing pressures of grid operations,
why containment failed, and recommendations on preventing
future cascade occurrences, visit ICF Consulting's special
section on Understanding
the 2003 Northeast Power Outage, Cascading Blackouts, &
the Transmission Grid.
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ICF International (Nasdaq: ICFI) partners with government and commercial clients to deliver consulting services and technology solutions in the energy, environment, transportation, social programs, defense, and homeland security markets. The firm combines passion for its work with industry expertise and innovative analytics to produce compelling results throughout the entire program life cycle, from analysis and design through implementation and improvement. Since 1969, ICF has been serving government at all levels, major corporations, and multilateral institutions. More than 1,800 employees serve these clients worldwide. ICF’s Web site is http://www.icfi.com.
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For Immediate Release
Contact: Douglas Beck
1.703.934.3820
Contact: Philip Mihlmester
1.703.934.3560
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